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Abstract
Ethics supervision of constitutional justices is an important issue for the 
development of ethics supervision system in the Constitutional Court, because the 
supervision of constitutional justices is a means of maintaining the independence 
and impartiality of constitutional justices, which is in fact the main pillar of 
an independent judiciary. In its development, there has always been a debate 
about the ethics supervision of the constitutional justices, whether the justices 
should be overseen externally or internally. This is because, juridically, the law 
does not regulate it clearly. Based on the above background, the research issues 
drawn are: (1) What is the significance of ethics supervision toward constitutional 
justices ?; (2) What is the system of ethics supervision of constitutional justices 
according to Indonesia’s current positive law, (3) How to reconstruct the system 
of ethics supervision of constitutional justices more optimally in the future? 
Based on the result of the research entitled “Reconstruction of Ethics Supervision 
System toward Constitutional Justice”, the following conclusions are obtained: (1) 
Based on philosophical, juridical and empirical perspective, ethics supervision 
of constitutional justices has important meaning in order to maintain and 
uphold the honor, dignity, and the behavior of constitutional justices. (2) Based 
on the analysis of the evolution of the ethics supervision system, the result 
shows that the ethics supervision system toward constitutional justices which 
is always changing indicates that there is still no standard system as a guideline 
for the enforcement of alleged violation of ethics against the constitutional 
justices. Therefore, there is a need for normative reconstruction of the ethics 
supervision system toward constitutional justices through legislation. (3) The 
reconstruction of the ethics supervision system toward constitutional justices 
can be done through: a. Amendment to the 1945 Constitution by adding a new 
norm governing the provision on ethics supervision system toward constitutional 
justices, b. Amendment to the Constitutional Court Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Article 1 (3) of the 1945 Constitution states “the state of Indonesia is a state 
based on law”. The important principle of rule of law state is a guarantee of the 
implementation of independent judicial power, free from the influence of other 
powers, (independence), and non-partisan (impartiality). Independence has three 
(3) dimensions, namely the functional dimension, structure or institutional, and 
personal. First, the functional dimension implies a prohibition against other 
institutions and all parties to influence or intervention; Second, the structure or 
institutional dimension, implies institutional justice must also be independent 
and impartial; Third, the personal dimension implies judges have the freedom 
on the basis of capabilities (expertise), accountability, and adherence to the code 
of ethics and code of conduct.1
Personal dimension in the sense that a judge is the representative of Allah 
(khalifah) on earth who holds respectable position (nobile officium) and noble. One 
task of a judge is to uphold law and justice, which is reflected in their decision 
in the name of the One and Only God, who will not only be accountable to the 
public, to the parties litigant, but also to God in the Hereafter.2The authority 
possessed by a judge in its implementation should be carried out in order to 
enforce the law and justice as mandated by Allah. In addition, a judge, either 
personally or institutionally, must be held accountable. It is such demand for 
accountability which requires that a judge should have moral and ethical integrity.3 
Therefore, to maintain moral integrity and ethics of judges, there needs to be 
supervision arrangement set forth in the guidelines of ethics and conduct of 
judges as the minimum standard that must be followed by a judge.4
A judge is an honorable office (nobile officium).5 Therefore, the judge, as a 
man of noble-sounding title, is obliged to preserve the honor and dignity and 
1  Sekretariat Jenderal MK-RI, Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi,Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2010, p. 19.
2 Wildan Suyuti Mustofa, Kode Etik Hakim,Jakarta: Kencana Prenadamedia Group, Cetakan Kedua, 2013, p. 267.1
3  Jurdi, Komisi Yudisial, Yogyakarta: Kreasi Wacana, 2007, p. 75.
4 Ibid.
5 Ahmad Fadil Sumadi, Pengadilan,Fungsi Manajemen Mahkamah Agung Terhadap Pengadilan di Bawahnya Setelah Perubahan UUD 
1945,Malang: Setara Press, Cetakan Pertama, 2013, p. 217.
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the nobility of good behavior in order to maintain the glory of office he bears. 
In this perspective the supervision of judges gains its importance.6  Thus, the 
nature of the supervision of the judge is to maintain the glory of the judge 
and control the judges in performing their duties and authorities to prevent 
them from violation of moral and ethical integrity.Supervision or control in 
the judiciary can be distinguished between the supervision of the judicial 
institution and supervision of judges as the main actors of judicial power. As 
a judicial institution it should also be independent and impartial in running 
the judiciary, so it is not justified that other institutions influence the course 
of justice. As to the judges who have freedom, it is not in the sense of freedom 
without limits. Judicial independence is associated with the implementation of 
its constitutional duties, while the conduct of judges is not free from scrutiny. 
Therefore, monitoring is not intended to supervise judges in carrying out their 
duties and authorities, but to supervise the judges in their behavior (ethics)7 in 
order to preserve and uphold the honor, dignity and behavior of judges.
Based on the above legal construction, according to the author, following 
Constitutional Court Decision Number 005 / PUU-IV / 2006, Constitutional 
Court Decision No. 49 / PUU-IX / 2011, and Constitutional Court Decision No. 
1-2 / PUU-XII / 2014, control system of ethics against constitutional judges is 
unclear as the legal basis for the formation, position, composition and authority 
and procedures or oversight mechanism is not clear and does not have a strong 
juridical basis. Therefore, in this dissertation, the author will conduct an in-depth 
study related to the monitoring system of ethics to the constitutional justice, 
both the system that has been applied and that which is currently in force, so 
that comprehensive understanding concerning issues related to the supervision 
system of ethics at the Constitutional Court would be obtained.
Based on the above description, the objective of this study is to examine 
and analyze the supervision system of ethics of the constitutional judges and 
recommend the importance of reconstructing the supervision system of ethics to 
6 Ibid, p. 216-217.
7 In the conceptual part, because  supervision in the judiciary is intended to supervise the conduct of judges (the Constitutional 
Court Justices), thus, in this study, supervision would mean supervision of ethics.
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optimize the monitoring system of ethics against constitutional judges in order 
to preserve and uphold the honor, dignity, and the behaviour of constitutional 
justices in the future so that the constitutional judges will be protected from 
abuse of authority, their dignity preserved and the independent judicial power 
can be realized to enforce law and justice.
B. Research Question
Referring to the above background, this study proposes three questions, 
namely:
1. What is the significance of ethics supervision against constitutional justices 
within the framework of independent judicial power?
2. How does the system of ethics supervision toward Constitutional Justices 
work in maintaining and upholding the honor, dignity and conducts of the 
Constitutional Justices according to the Indonesian positive law today?
3. How to optimize the reconstruction of supervision system of ethics toward 
Constitutional Justice in order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity 
and conducts of the Constitutional Justice in the future?
C. Research Method
This research is a normative legal research, which uses doctrinal method in 
analyzin principles and norms of legislation relating to the ethics supervision 
system toward constitutional justices. Normative legal research conceptualize 
the principles and doctrines as well as a set of norms in the legislation, in 
this case the norms related to ethics supervision system of constitutional 
justices in order to preserve and uphold the honor and dignity, as well as the 
behavior of the constitutional justices. There are 6 (six) approaches used in 
this study, namely: statute approach, comparative approach, historical approach, 
philosophical approach, case approach and legal interpretation approach.
In line with the research method, the researcher in this research will use 
primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials, obtained in the Constitutional 
Court library as and other libraries otuside the Court. Primary legal materials, 
including: (1) the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia; (2) of Law 
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Number 48 Year 2009 regarding Judicial Power; (3) of Law Number 14 Year 
1985 regarding the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 on the 
Amendment to Law Number 14 Year 1985 regarding the Supreme Court, as 
amended by Law Number 3 of 2009 concerning Second Amendment to Law 
Number 14 Year 1985 regarding the Supreme Court; (4) Law Number 24 Year 
2003 regarding the Constitutional Court, as amended by Law Number 8 of 2011 
on the Amendment to Law Number 24 Year 2003 regarding the Constitutional 
Court, as amended by Law Number 4 of 2014 regarding the Stipulation of 
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 Year 2013 on the Second 
Amendment to Law Number 24 Year 2003 regarding the Constitutional Court 
to Become Law, and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 Year 
2013 on the Second Amendment to Law Number 24 Year 2003 regarding 
the Constitutional Court; (5) Law Number 22 Year 2004 concerning Judicial 
Commission as amended by Law Number 18 of 2011 on the Amendment to 
Law Number 22 Year 2004 concerning Judicial Commission; and Constitutional 
Court Regulations which are related the object of the research.
Secondary legal materials which include: Minutes of Discussion of the 
Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, Bill on the Constitutional Court and the 
its Minutes of Discussion, Bill on the Judicial Commission and its Minutes of 
Discussion, the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the decisions of other 
courts, research papers, law journals, other scholarly works. While tertiary legal 
materials, namely, among others are dictionaries and encyclopedias.
II. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The Importance of Ethics Supervision towards Constitutional Justice in 
the Framework of Independent Judiciary
The Researcher will describe briefly the arguments underlying the importance 
of the ethic supervision of  the constitutional judges, from a philosophical 
perspective, juridical, and empirical. Philosophical perspectives are based on 
philosophical approaches carried out by tracking the basic concepts, such as 
a human concept, the concept of ethics and the concept of freedom. Juridical 
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perspective will be presented by using a normative approach. While empirical 
perspective will be presented by using a case approach.
1. Philosophical Perspective
First, from the aspect of human philosophy, the concept of supervision 
towards constitutional justices is based on the concept of honorable judges, 
namely keeping the human soul with soul, become patron of the parties to 
the dispute, be an impartial mediator, have the authority to establish justice, 
has the authority to determine a person’s guilt and the authority to punish 
someone who is found guilty.Second, from the aspect of ethics, supervision 
of constitutional justices departed from ethics as a code of ethics, in this 
case the Code of Ethics and Conduct of Constitutional Justice. The values 
contained in the Code of Ethics and Conduct of Constitutional Justice 
originated from Moral Philosophy, but the Code itself functions as a working 
guideline or moral teachings of the constitutional justices. Thus, the Code 
is the legalization of moral values in order to be enforced by the workings 
of the legal norms. The working of the law is to provide the institution that 
has the legitimate authority; there is penalty and punishment for violators. 
To determine the morality of the constitutional justices, the Code of Ethics 
of Constitutional Court Justice adheres to deontological and consequentialist 
ethics. Deontological ethics means judging a moral or immoral action by 
seeing whether the conduct violates or does not violate the Code of Ethics. 
Whereas consequentialist ethics means judging that an action called immoral 
because it is bad for public interest.
2. Juridical/Legal Perspective
Legal perspective can be traced from legal norms that are in the legislation. 
According Satjipto Rahardjo, states that the law is not only a statutory 
document that consists of thousands of articles, but rather a moral document, 
which saves a moral message to social life. Supervision of constitutional 
justices are the commands of laws and egulations, starting from the 1945 
Constitution, the Act to the more technical rules which is Constitutional 
Court Regulation (PMK).
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3. Empirical Perspective
Empirically, it can be traced from several events concerning enforcement 
of alleged ethics violations committed by constitutional justices. Enforcement 
of alleged violations of ethics is not only done by the Honorary Council of 
the Constitutional Court, but has also been conducted by an Investigative 
Team and Ethics Panel of the Constitutional Court. However, empirically, 
the system of ethics supervisionrunning today is carried out by a permanent 
Board of Ethics of the Constitutional Court and Assembly of Honor of the 
Constitutional Court which is ad hoc in nature. 
Therefore, either from philosophical, juridical and empirical perspective, 
ethics supervision of the constitutional justices has significant importance 
in order to preserve and uphold the honor, dignity, and the conduct of the 
constitutional justices and the nobility of the Constitutional Court.
4. Ethics Supervision in the Framework of Judicial Power
According to the theory of supervision of judges, supervision is the activity 
to locate, assess and correct irregularities that may occur or have occurred 
based on the prevailing laws and regulations.8 While theory of rule of law 
state says that “the important principle of rule of law state is the guarantee 
for the implementation of independent judicial power.” Independence of 
the judiciary is reflected in the independence of the constitutional justices 
which is a key element within the judiciary itself. The independence of the 
judges should not be understood in absolute terms that an effective external 
institution in the field of judicial ethics is required as a balancing mechanism 
for independence and impartiality. The independence of judges, in some 
cases, has become a way for judges to act in tyrannical way by behaving 
in a distorted,corrupt and collusive manner. Thus, the judicial authority 
without adequate controls would likely give birth to absolutism in judicial 
institutions or judicial tyranny.9
8 Imam Anshori, Konsep Pengawasan Hakim, Op.Cit. p. 26.
9 A. Ahsin Thohari, Desain Konstitusional Komisi Yudisial dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia, Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia, Vol. 7 
No. 1, Maret, Jakarta: Direktorat Kenderal Peraturan Perundang-undangan Kementerian Hukum dan HAM, 2010, p. 71.
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Freedom of constitutional justice would not mean freedom without limit, 
but limited by laws and ethical codes that are implemented in the form of 
ethics supervision, and also freedom is an integral part of accountability. 
Therefore, the supervision of the constitutional justices do not conflict with 
the principle of independence of the judges as long as  it is not in the realm 
of execution of their duties and functions.
The System of Ethics Supervision towards Constitutional Justices Based 
on Positive Law in Indonesia Today.
This section consists of two sub-topics. First, exposure to the evolution 
and dynamics of the practices and regulation of ethics supervision towards 
constitutional justices which will be divided into five periods. Second, analysis 
on the dynamics of this supervision.
1. Evolution of the System of Ethics Supervision towards Constitutional 
Justice
Supervision of constitutional justice has been regulated and practiced 
since the Constitutional Justices were inaugurated on August 16, 2003, with 
the issuance of PMK No. 02 of 2003, on 24 September 2003 on the Code 
of Ethics and Code of Conduct of the Constitutional Justices. In fact, the 
discussion on the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct of the Constitutional 
Justice was done prior to the discussion concerning rules of order of the 
court hearing, law of procedures, etc. This shows that the constitutional 
justices in the first period put integrity more important before performing 
their duties and authorities.In the process, the Court made several changes 
to the rules relating to the supervision of the justices. This suggests that the 
process of constitutional justice supervision regulation did not come out of 
the blue, but was influenced by the situation and empirical conditions that 
are also constantly changing.
In the opinion of M. Ali Safa’at, the monitoring would not be done to 
the verdict and the authority of the constitutional justices in carrying out 
justice, but towards the behavior of the justices so that their dignity, honor, 
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and statesmanship well-preserved.Based on the theory and the opinion of 
legal experts as explained above, as well as considering the development 
and the dynamics of the ethics supervision towards constitutional justices 
as mentioned earlier, the supervision system of constitutional justice can 
be divided into (5) five periodicities, namely:
1. The first period, started since the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court until the birth of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 005 / 
PUU-IV / 2006, dated August 23, 2006;
Development of this period can be traced through normative 
perspective and the implementation of ethics supervision towards 
constitutional justices. Normative perspective is derived by analyzing 
the provisions of Law No. 24 of 2003, and the Regulations of the 
Constitutional Court, as well as the decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
and in Law No. 22 of 2004 and its implementing rules. Meanwhile, 
implementation perspective is built by analyzing the application of a 
system of ethics supervision towards constitutional justices, both the 
system run by the Constitutional Court and the one practiced by the 
Judicial Commission.
This period ended with the cancellation of the entire rules on 
the supervision of the judge which is the authority of the Judicial 
Commission through Constitutional Court Decision No. 005 / PUU-IV 
/ 2006 on Judicial Review of Law Number 22 Year 2004 concerning 
Judicial Commission and the Law Number 4 of 2004 on Judicial Power 
against the 1945 Constitution. This is the most important stage in the 
dynamics of the ethics supervision system of the constitutional justices.
In the first period, based on the theory of supervision of judges as 
described in paragraph 2.1.3, the application of the supervision system of 
ethics against constitutional justices is supposed to be an ideal system, 
because in addition to the internal control system through the Honorary 
Assembly of the Constitutional Court, external monitoring system which 
is the authority of the Judicial Commission is also applied.
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2. The second period, beginning after the birth of the Constitutional Court 
Decision No. 005 / PUU-IV / 2006 until the enactment of Law No. 8 
of 2011; 
Analyzing the basis of the legal argument constructed by the 
Constitutional Court in the judgment of the Court Decision Number 
005 / PUU-IV / 2006, the main reason why later the Constitutional 
Court annulled the authority of the Judicial Commission to oversee the 
Constitutional Court Justices is related to the freedom /independence of 
the judiciary. In its consideration, the Constitutional Court has always 
stressed that the independence of the judiciary is a bastion (safeguards) 
of the rule of law which is mandated by the constitution.10  Moving 
on from these thoughts the Constitutional Court argues that judicial 
independence must be protected against all pressures, influence and 
interference from anyone. Judicial independence is a fundamental 
prerequisite for the realization of the idea of the rule of law state and 
a guarantee for the enforcement of law and justice.11 Oversight by other 
state institutions, according to the Constitutional Court, is a form of 
interference in judicial independence.
The Constitutional Court also dismissed the notion that the 
Constitutional Court can be monitored by other state institutions on 
the basis of the principle of checks and balances. For according to the 
Constitutional Court, the principle of checks and balances applies only 
to the executive branch and the legislative. But interestingly it turns out 
that the Constitutional Court also actually realizes that the monitoring 
of the behavior of the constitutional justices can be actualized.
Due to the decision concerning the Judicial Commission and the Law 
on Judicial Power through the Constitutional Court Decision Number 
005 / PUU-IV / 2006, the supervision system of the constitutional 
justices is no longer under the authority of the Judicial Commission. As 
10  Ni’matul Huda, Dinamika Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Dalam Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi, FH UII Press, Yogyakarta, 2011, p. 170.
11 Ibid., p. 171.
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a consequence, the system of ethics supervision is internal only through 
the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court as provided for in 
Article 23 paragraph (5) of the Constitutional Court Law and shall be 
further regulated by the Regulation of the Constitutional Court.
Related to the opinion of the Constitutional Court in the 
aforementioned decision, the author agrees with the opinion of M. Ali 
Safa’at12 that regardless of the nature of a Constitutional Court ruling 
which is final and binding, permanent supervision is needed to prevent 
abuse of power. Oversight is not done to the verdict and authority of 
constitutional justices in carrying out justice, but towards the behavior 
of the justices so that their dignity, honor, and statesmanship are well-
preserved.
The existence of institutions that conduct oversight would not in 
itself be regarded as disturbing the independence and impartiality of the 
Constitutional Court. Also, it would not be appropriate if there is a view 
that the supervisory agency has a higher position than those supervised. 
Just like the position of the Constitutional Court, which annuls the law 
made by the House of Representatives and the President, that is not higher 
than the two institutions. The Constitutional institution which is most 
appropriate to perform supervision would be the Judicial Commission.
Further opinions are as follows: 
First, the argument (judgment a quo) is less compelling and 
convincing. Concerning the argument about interpretation, what was 
used was systematic interpretation. But if broader interpretation was 
used13 with the purpose to bring about a strong judiciary, supervision 
towards the conduct of the constitutional court justices is surely required 
12   M. Ali Safa’at, Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Sistem Checks and Balances, dalam Mukthie Fadjar, Konstitusionalisme Konstitusi, 
Op.Cit. p. 33.
13  Sekretariat Jenderal Mahkamah Konstitusi, Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi, Op.Cit.p. 63-80 (Satjipto Rahardjo, citing the 
opinion of Fitzgerald argued that in general, interpretation can be divided into two (2) types, namely (1) a literal interpretation, 
and (2) functional interpretation. Based on the findings of law, it can be divided into (1) a method of restrictive interpretation; 
and extensive interpretation. Meanwhile, according to Sudikno Mertokusumo and A. Pitlo, interpretation can be divided into (1) 
grammatical interpretation or interpretation based on language; (2) The teleological or sociological interpretation; (3) systematic 
or logical interpretation; (4) historical interpretation; (5) comparative interpretation; and (6) futuristic interpretation.) 
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so that their statesmanship can be well-preserved. From the perspective 
of original intent, testimony from the government and the House was 
also heard which stated that supervision by the Judicial Commission 
was also intended to be applied to the constitutional justices.
Second, the status of constitutional justices as judges due to their 
position which is elected for a period of five years would not be sufficient 
reason to remove it from the definition of “judges” who will be supervised 
by the Constitutional Court. The Judicial Commission can even conduct 
supervision to Supreme Court justices recruited from a non-career ladder. 
Recruitment system for the positions of judges is certainly less significant 
to serve as a basis for the distinction in supervision.
Third, when KY has the authority to supervise the conduct of the 
Constitutional Justices, it does not put KY in a higher position than the 
Constitutional Court. The subject matter of supervision is also outside 
the case and the judicial authority run by the Constitutional Court. 
Therefore, when the Judicial Commission carries the authority to supervise 
the conduct of the constitutional justices, the Constitutional Court does 
not need independence and impartiality in hearing and deciding cases 
concerning disputes on authority involving the Constitutional Court 
as one of the parties. In line with the above opinion, Titik Triwulan 
Tutik in her research states that if examined there are inconsistencies 
and weakness in the opinion in the opinion of the Court because the 
Constitution explicitly says that the judicial power is performed by the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.
Thus, as a consequence of judicial power, constitutional justices 
cannot be excluded from the definition of a judge under Article 24B 
paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. Because judicial power is 
implemented by judges in all courts, then the consequence is that 
constitutional justice is included in the definition of judge. In addition, 
in the records of discussion of the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, 
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it was never mentioned that the constitutional justice is excluded from 
the definition of judge, and statutory provisions does not separate the 
definition of judges based on the scope, then all the judges in the realm 
of judicial power, including constitutional justices should be intended 
as a judge.
3. The third period, starting from the enactment of Law No. 8 of 2011, which 
was followed by Constitutional Court Decision No. 49/PUU-IX/2011 to 
the enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2013 
(Perppu No. 1 of 2013); Periode ketiga, dimulai sejak diundangkannya UU 
Nomor 8 Tahun 2011 yang diikuti dengan lahirnya Putusan Mahkamah 
Konstitusi Nomor 49/PUU-IX/2011 sampai dengan diundangkannya 
Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2013 
(Perppu Nomor 1 Tahun 2013); 
A fairly fundamental change regarding mechanisms for enforcement 
of Code of Ethics of Constitutional Justice in Law No. 8 of 2011 is the 
normative construction which orders the Constitutional Court to develop 
a Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct of the Constitutional Justice and 
to establish Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court. Referring 
to the provisions of Article 27A paragraph (1) and (2) of Law No. 8 of 
2011 which states that:
The Constitutional Court shall draw up the Code of Ethics and 
Code of Conduct for Constitutional Court Justices containing 
norms to be complied with by every constitutional court justice in 
the performance of their duties in order to safeguard integrity and 
impeccable personality, being just and statesmanship. 
Furthermore paragraph (2) stipulates that:
In order to uphold the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct for 
Constitutional Court Justices as referred to in paragraph (1), Honorary 
Assembly of the Constitutional Court shall be established with a 
membership consisting of:
a. 1 (one) constitutional court justice;
b. 1 (one) member of the Judicial CVommission;
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c. 1 (one) person from the DPR;
d. 1 (one) person from the government who organizes government 
affairs in the field of law; and
e. 1 (one) supreme court justice.
Then Article 27A paragraph (7) of Law No. 8 of 2011, assets that 
further provisions regarding the composition, organization and order 
fo procedure for sessions of Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional 
Court shall be regulated by a Regulation of the Constitutional Court. But 
interestingly a number of the provisions were submitted for a review to 
the Constitutional Court, and through the Constitutional Court Decision 
No. 49/PUU-IX/2011, the articles filed, namely Article 27A paragraph (2) 
point c, point d, and point e, paragraph (3), paragraph (4), paragraph 
(5) and paragraph (6) of Law No. 8 of 2011 were declared contrary to 
the 1945 Constitution.
However, empirically that the Constitutional Court is aware of 
the legal consequences that arise with such decision handed down, 
particularly with regard to the formulation of the code of ethics and 
code of conduct of constitutional justices, as well as membership of 
the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court will further regulate it through PMK.
4. The fourth period, starting from the promulgation of Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2013 to the birth of Constitutional 
Court Decision No. 1-2 / PUU-XII / 2014;
The regulation of ethics supervision system in this period can 
be regarded as a new phase of ethics supervision system against the 
constitutional justices. Because there are many changes to the system 
of ethics supervision adopted by Perppu No. 1 of 2013. A number of 
significant changes regarding the system of ethics supervision certainly 
cannot be separated from the background underlying the issuance of 
the Perppu.
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In Perppu No. 1 of 2013 there were interesting and different regulations 
related to the ethics supervision system of constitutional justices 
compared with previous regulation. One fundamental difference in this 
regulation is to reinstate external supervision that the Judicial Commission 
to be involved in the ethics supervision of constitutional justices, though 
not the totality of the supervisory authority of constitutional justice 
under the authority of the Judicial Commission. Thus, the Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2013 can be said to revive the norms 
that have been annulled by the Constitutional Court, although it is not 
entirely the authority of the Judicial Commission.
Article 1 paragraph 4 of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law 
No. 1 of 2013 states, “Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court 
is an organ established by the Constitutional Court and the Judicial 
Commission to safeguard the honor and the behavior of constitutional 
justice”.14 The provision of this article clearly revives the authority of 
the Judicial Commission to be involved in overseeing the constitutional 
justices albeit with different scale and degree.
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2013 authorizes 
the enforcement of the Code of Ethics of Constitutional Justices to 
an institution named “Honorary Assembly of Constitutional Justice”. 
Nomenclature Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Justice is a 
new one because in the previous period the nomenclature used was 
“Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court.” The establishment of 
the Honorary Assembly of Constitutional Justice was carried out jointly 
by the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission as provided 
for in Article 27A paragraph (4) which states, “In order to enforce the 
Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct of the Constitutional Court referred 
to in paragraph (1), the Constitutional Court together with the Judicial 
Commission formed a permanent Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional 
14  Republik Indonesia, Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2013 tentang Perubahan 
Kedua atas Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2003 tentang Mahkamah Konstitusi, LN Tahun 2013 Nomor 167, TLN Nomor 5456, 
Pasal 1 angka 4.
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Justice.”15 This article also reconfirms the involvement of the Judicial 
Commission in the system of ethics supervision of constitutional justices. 
Based on this article, it is found out that the existence of the Honorary 
Assembly of the Constitutional Justice is permanent in nature, not an ad 
hoc institution. The permanent nature of the Honorary Assembly of the 
Constitutional Justice is also undoubtedly different from the Honorary 
Assembly which is temporary or ad hoc.
The composition of the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional 
Justice is regulated under Article 27A paragraph (5) Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1/2013 which governs that the membership 
of the Assembly is 5 (five) people consisting of: 
a. 1 (one) former constitutional justice; 
b. 1 (one) legal practitioner; 
c. 2 (two) academics in which one or both have backgrounds in law; 
and
d. 1 (one) community leader. 
Based on these compositions, all members of the Honorary Assembly 
of the Constitutional Justice are from outside the institution of the 
Constitutional Court. The term of office of the Honorary Assembly of 
the Constitutional Justice is 5 (five) years and can not be reelected.16 
Thus, the members of the Honorary Assembly of Constitutional Justice 
can only assume the post for one period only.
Based on the above consideration, it is understood that, in this 
period, there are two systems of ethics supervision towards constitutional 
justices, namely: first, the system of ethics supervision which is regulated 
in Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2013 as has been passed 
into law No. 4 of 2014 on January 15, 2014 with the Honorary Assembly 
of the Constitutional Justice as an enforcing institution. Secondly, the 
system of ethics supervision as set forth in PMK No. 2 of 2013 that the 
15  Ibid., Pasal 27A ayat (4).
16  Ibid., Pasal 27A ayat (7).
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idea of its formation comes from the Constitutional Court itself, and 
the implementing organ is the Ethics Council of Constitutional Justice.
Interestingly, the system of ethics supervision set out in the 
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law has No. 1 of 2013 as has been 
passed into law No. 4 of 2014 is not applicable for long. Along with the 
birth of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 1-2 / PUU-XII / 2014 on 
Judicial Review of Law No. 4 of 2014 on the Stipulation of Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 Year 2013 on the Second Amendment 
to Law Number 24 Year 2003 regarding Constitutional Court to Become 
Law, dated February 13, 2014 of which the verdict states that the Law 
No. 4 of 2014 is contrary to the 1945 Constitution and does not have 
binding legal force, the system of ethics supervision as regulated in the 
Law No. 4 of 2014, since then, comes to an end.
Based on the analysis of the Writer concerning the substance of the 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 1-2 / PUU-XII / 2014, there are at 
least three (3) main reasons related to ethics supervision system found 
which are as follows:
First, the principle of checks and balances does not apply to the 
branch of judiciary, but only for the legislative and executive branches 
of power. Complete judgment can be found in the legal considerations 
of the Constitutional Court paragraph 3.22 subparagraph one of decision 
a quo.
Second, independent power is the spirit of the judiciary, so that it 
can not be restricted let alone intervened. Complete judgment can be 
found in the legal considerations of the Constitutional Court decision 
paragraph 3.22 subparagraph two of decision a quo.
Thirdly, the involvement of the Judicial Commission in the supervision 
of constitutional justices constitutes smuggling of law that is conflicting 
with decisions of the Constitutional Court earlier. More reasoning can be 
found in the legal considerations of the Constitutional Court paragraph 
3.22 subparagraph eleven of the decision a quo.
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Those three reasons that convince the Constitutional Court to declare 
Law No. 4 of 2014, including ethics supervision systems of constitutional 
justices which revive the role of the Judicial Commission contrasts with 
the 1945 Constitution.
5. The fifth period began after the birth of the Constitutional Court Decision 
No. 1-2 / PUU-XII / 2014 until now. 
As a legal consequence of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 1-2 
/ PUU-XII / 2014 in which one of the verdicts state:
Law No. 4 of 2014 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation 
in Lieu of Law No. 1 Year 2013 on the Second Amendment to Law 
Number 24 Year 2003 regarding the Constitutional Court to Become 
Law and its attachments (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia 
Year 2014 Number 5, Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic 
of Indonesia Number 5493) contradictory to the 1945 Constitution 
of the Republic of Indonesia
then the Law No. 4 of 2014 is no longer valid because it has no 
binding legal force and Law No. 24 of 2003 as amended by Law No. 8 
of 2011 on the Amendment to Law Number 24 Year 2003 regarding the 
Constitutional Court applies back as before the change.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court stipulates PMK No. 2 of 
2014 on the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court (PMK No. 
2 of 2014), which revoked PMK No. 1 of 2013 and PMK No. 2 of 2013. 
Substantially there are not many changes regulated in PMK No. 2 of 2014. 
In fact, it can be said PMK No. 2 of 2014 substantially only incorporate 
the provisions contained in the PMK No. 1 of 2013 and PMK No. 2 of 2013.
Article 1 point 3 in connection with (juncto) Article 14 Paragraph 
(1) of PMK No. 2 of 2014 state as follows: 
Board of Ethics of Constitutional Justice, hereinafter the Board 
of Ethics, is an organ formed by the Constitutional Court for 
maintaining the honor, nobility, dignity, and the Code of Ethics of 
Constitutional Justice in response to the report and information filed 
by the society on the alleged violation committed by a Reported 
Judge or an Alleged Judge.
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While Article 14 Paragraph (2) of PMK No. 2 of 2014 states that the 
position of the Board of Ethics is permanent in nature.
Based on such legal construction, if observed, the presence of the 
Board of Ethics of the Constitutional Court is considered as a part of 
the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court is not visible and 
can even be said that there is overlapping in its regulation. Since the 
two organs in question, both maintain and enforce the Code of Ethics 
and Code of Conduct of the Constitutional Justice. The difference is that 
there might be sanctions imposed on the reported judge or the alleged 
judge. In fact, it can be said that the Board of Ethics has a strategic role 
in the enforcement of the code of ethics of the constitutional justice. The 
Board of Ethics plays a role to perform a “day to day” supervision against 
the conduct of the constitutional justices and is permanent in nature. 
While the presence of the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional 
Court is based on the recommendation of the Board of Ethics, and is 
ad hoc in nature.
On the one hand, the presence of the Board of Ethics provides 
fresh air to the prospect of enforcement of the code of ethics of the 
constitutional justices. But on the other hand, the presence of the Board 
of Ethics raises a number of questions among law observers. Some things 
that are considered problematic in relation to the existence of the Board 
of Ethics are as follows: first, the legal basis for the establishment of the 
Board of Ethics. As mentioned earlier, the establishment of the Board 
of Ethics is not based on the command of the law but only based on 
the PMK. In constitutional terms, it is certainly very problematic and 
potentially raises the issue of lack of legal certainty.
Second, related to the budget to finance the Board of Ethics. As the 
implications of the absence of a law which serves as the legal basis for the 
formation of the Board of Ethics, there appears a debate about whether 
the Board of Ethics can be financed using the State Budget (APBN). 
This issue is certainly crucial to answer, given the absence of the budget 
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allocated specifically, an institution would not be able to run well.Third, 
related to the qualifications Board of Ethics Council, whether it is an 
internal supervisory organ or an external oversight body. Considering 
the composition of the Board of Ethics, it is difficult to say that this 
institution is an internal watchdog, for the entire composition of the 
membership comes from outside the Constitutional Court (external). It 
is stipulated in Article 15 of PMK No. 2 of 2014 that the Board of Ethics 
has a fixed members of 3 (three) people for a period of 3 (three) years 
consisting of (1) one former constitutional justice, (1) one law professor, 
and (1) one community leader.17 However, since the Board of Ethics is 
established by the Constitutional Court, it is also difficult to say that 
this institution is an external agency.
Ambivalence regarding the qualifications of the Board of Ethics is 
certainly very problematic, given the Constitutional Court in its decision 
No. 005 / PUU-IV / 2006 and strengthened in decision No. 1-2 / PUU-
XII / 2014 has stated that the Constitutional Court as the executor of 
independent judicial power can not be intervened in any form. Oversight 
of other state institutions to the Constitutional Court would interfere with 
the independence of constitutional justices in exercising its authority.
Based on the above explanation, if the Board of Ethics is qualified as 
an external supervisor, then it certainly shows inconsistencies of the 
Constitutional Court in addressing the design for the supervision system 
of the constitutional justices. Besides, the PMK No. 2 of 2014 also regulates 
the allocation of the duties and authorities between the Board of Ethics 
and the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, 
the Board of Ethics and the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional 
Court are both the organs established by the Constitutional Court to 
maintain and uphold the honor, dignity and the codes of ethics of the 
constitutional justices. Honorary Assembly is established based on the 
recommendation of the Board of Ethics, but there is an allocation of 
17  See Article 15 Constitutional Court Regulation Number 2 of 2014 on the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court .
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roles and responsibilities between the two. Referring to the division of 
tasks and responsibilities between the Board of Ethics and the Honorary 
Assembly of the Constitutional Court, it can be concluded that Board 
of Ethics is authorized to oversee minor violations of the code of ethics 
of the constitutional justices, while the Honorary Assembly’s authority 
is to enforce the code of ethics against major violations.
With the establishment of the Board of Ethics in this period, it 
can be concluded that the Constitutional Court still actually needs a 
supervisory agency in order to preserve and uphold the honor, dignity 
and the conduct constitutional justices, regardless of whether the agency 
is internal or external. The qualification of the Board of Ethics itself 
remains a debate as to whether the Board of Ethics that can be qualified 
as an internal supervisory agency or an external watchdog.
  According to Mukthie Fajar,18 in essence, based on its composition 
that comes from outside the Constitutional Court, the Board of 
Ethics can be categorized as an external oversight organ. However, 
institutionally, it was formed and is within the organizational structure 
of the Constitutional Court so that it can be classified as an internal 
supervisory body as well. It is this condition that makes it difficult to 
remove the position of the Board of Ethics from qualifying as an internal 
or external oversight institutions. Also, the establishment of the Council 
of Ethics does not have a firm legal basis, since the order of legislation 
is to establish the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court, and 
not to create the Board of Ethics of Constitutional Justice.
In line with the opinion of Mukthie Fajar, according to the author, 
internal control is not effective and optimal enough for maintaining 
the honor, dignity, and code of ethics of the constitutional justices. In 
order to optimize and effectuate the ethics supervision of constitutional 
justices, the supervision should be conducted by internal and external 
18 Interview with the Chairman of the Board of Ethics (Mukthie Fadjar), in the office of the Board of Ethics, Constitutional Court 
Building, Tuesday, 27 December 2016. 
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supervisory watchdog. However, it has been widely understood 
that external supervisors juridically can not be done prior to their 
rearrangement through normative reconstruction in the 1945 Constitution 
and/or through an organic law. This is because in the Constitutional 
Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, as explained above, among 
others, the Constitutional Court argued that constitutional justice does 
not include in the definition of “judges” as referred to in Article 24B 
paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, whose ethical behavior overseen 
by the Judicial Commission. So the supervision of the implementation 
of the Code of Ethics of the Constitutional Justice is performed by a 
separate Honorary Assembly independently in accordance with Law No. 
24 of 2003 as amended by Law No. 8 of 2011 on the Constitutional Court.
According to Muhammad Nuh,19 the ineffective and the non-optimal 
function of internal oversight of judicial institutions can be caused by 
several factors as follows: first, the quality and integrity of the supervisors 
are inadequate. Second, submitting complaints, monitoring the process 
and outcome (no access). Third, the spirit of defending fellow corps 
(esprit de corps), which resulted in sentencing is not proportional with 
violations. Any effort to improve a poor condition would definitely get 
a reaction from those who benefit from these bad conditions. Fourth, 
there is a strong will from the leadership of law enforcement agencies 
to follow up on the results of the monitoring.
Therefore, in the future, it is necessary to design a more optimal 
system of ethics supervision toward constitutional justices that is through 
an internal and external control system. This is done to optimize and 
make more effective the system of ethics supervision for constitutional 
justices, so that the dignity and honor of the constitutional justices are 
always well-preserved. Moreover, with such great authority granted by 
the 1945 Constitution, abuse of power practices are very likely to occur 
in the Constitutional Court, so that the Constitutional Court should have 
19  Muhammad Nuh, Etika Profesi Hukum, Bandung: Pustaka Setia, 2011, pp. 233-234.
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an effective monitoring system of ethics to protect the constitutional 
justices from violations of the code of ethics and abuse of power.
Reconstruction of Ethics Supervision System towards Constitutional Justice
Based on the normative construction as has been described in the previous 
Chapter, and in accordance with the objective of this study, which is the 
reconstruction of monitoring system of ethics against constitutional judges, in 
order to preserve and uphold the honor, dignity, and the conduct of constitutional 
justices, the main issues that may be proposed to be reconstructed have been 
identified namely some relevant norms concerning ethics supervision system 
of the constitutional justice through the amendment of Law No. 24 of 2003 as 
amended by Law No. 8 of 2011.
The researcher proposes three concepts to reconstruct ethics supervision 
system of the constitutional justices. First, at the level of argument about 
the judges in the constitution, the researcher agree with the opinion of the 
Constitutional Court, as contained in the Constitutional Court Decision No. 
005/PUU-IV/2006, Decision No. 49/PUU-IX/2011 and Decision No. 1-2/PUU-
XI/2016. These three decisions essentially affirm that constitutional justices are 
not included in the definition of judges whose ethical conduct is supervised 
by the Judicial Commission. For the sake of maintaining the honor, dignity, 
and the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct of the Constitutional Justice, the 
supervision is performed by an internal supervisory body which is based on 
Law No. 8 of 2011. But regarding the notion of judges in general, the author 
argues that constitutional justice is a judge, and therefore in the normative 
reconstruction of the 1945 constitution, this norm should be formulated clearly 
and unequivocally.
Second, at the level of legal basis, internal supervision of the constitutional 
justices should be regulated through normative reconstruction in Law No. 8 of 
2011. Third, at the level of supervisory organ, in my opinion, the regulation of the 
Board of Ethics of Constitutional Justice overlaps with the Honorary Assembly 
of the Constitutional Court, so it is necessary to simplify it by establishing one 
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ethics supervisory organ which is Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional 
Justice (MKHK).
 Based on the whole description in this study, the author is of the opinion 
that to provide a firm juridical foundation, it is necessary to incorporate the 
norms into the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, there needs to be a reconstruction 
of norms concerning supervision system of the constitutional justices through 
the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. However, the amendment of the 
1945 Constitution is not an easy mechanism, then to establish a monitoring 
system of ethics, what can be done in a not very long time is the amendments 
to the Constitutional Court Law. Therefore, the author proposes the normative 
reconstruction in the formulation of the Draft Amendment to Law Number 24 
of 2003 as amended by Law No. 8 of 2011, especially regarding the strengthening 
of the ethics supervisory agency of the constitutional justices, namely:
1. Regulation concerning the drafting of the Code of Ethics and Code of 
Conduct of the Constitutional Justice;
2. Regulation regarding the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Justice 
which contains, membership composition, requirements for candidate 
members, the nature of the organ, and recruitment mechanism through 
Panel of Experts;
3. Provisions concerning the Panel of Experts as an organ established by 
the Court to conduct fit and proper test for MKHK prospective members;
4. Further provisions regarding the structure, organization, rules of 
procedure for the proceedings in the Honorary Assembly of Constitutional 
Justice;
5. Further provisions on the Panel of Experts.
III. CONCLUSION
The Importance of ethics supervision towards Constitutional Justice in the 
Framework of independent Judicial Power, namely:
(1) Philosophical Perspective
The constitutional Justices are the main executors of the duties and 
authorities of the Constitutional Court in upholding the law and justice that 
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has respectable positions (noble officium). They have fulfilled the requirement 
of a Constitutional Justice and have been qualified as a judge, but it does 
not mean that the justices in carrying out their duties and responsibilities 
will be spared from mistake or wrongdoing. Therefore, to maintain that 
respectable office (noble officium) they shall keep the honor and dignity 
and good behavior in order to maintain the glory of the office they bear.
(2) Juridical Perspective.
Supervision of constitutional justice is a command of laws and regulations, 
namely the 1945 Constitution which contains basic norms of supervision 
of justices (Article 24B, Paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution) and Law No. 
8 of 2011. Therefore, the Constitutional Justice must abide by and adhere 
to the normative provisions regarding supervision system regulated in the 
legislation.
(3) Empirical Perspective.
Empirically, the Constitutional Court through the organs it established 
(Investigation Team, Ethics Panel, and the Honorary Assembly of the 
Constitutional Court) has made several legal enforcement on alleged ethics 
violation committed by constitutional justices. This indicates that there is 
no guarantee that a constitutional justice, before being inaugurated by the 
President, although already passed the fit and proper test by the Panel of 
Experts, in carrying out his/her duties and authorities will be prevented 
from abuse of authority.
Thus, ethics supervision towards justices is a necessity that must be present, in 
order to preserve and uphold the honor, dignity, and the conduct of constitutional 
justices. Supervision is absolutely necessary because according to Lord Acton, 
“the power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupt absolutely”.
Ethics Supervision System towards Constitutional Justice with the purpose to 
maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and the behavior of the Constitutional 
Justice according to the Positive Law in Indonesia, namely:   
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(1) In the context of supervision of the constitutional justices, in the beginning of 
the establishment of the Constitutional Court, after the election of the Chief 
Justice and Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, constitutional 
justices discussed the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct of Constitutional 
Justice, which is then passed through the PMK No. 02 of 2003, on September 
24, 2003. This shows that the constitutional justices in the first period put 
integrity first before carrying out their tasks and authorities.
(2) From the evolution of ethics supervision of constitutional justice, it is 
understood that the Constitutional Court made a number of changes to 
the rules relating to the ethics supervision of constitutional justices. This 
indicates that:
First, the constant change of the regulation on ethics supervision of 
constitutional justice shows that the process of regulating the ethics 
supervision is influenced by the situation and empirical conditions that are 
also constantly changing.
Second, in addition, these changes indicate that the Constitutional Court 
is open to changes.
Third, at first, there are two systems of supervision in the regulation 
concerning ethics supervision of the constitutional justice, namely internal 
control system performed by the Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional 
Court and external systems conducted by the Judicial Commission, but the 
external supervision is declared not to have binding legal force since the 
imposition of Constitutional Court Decision No. 005/PUU-IV/2006.
Fourth, in its development, the current systems of ethics supervision against 
constitutional justices is conducted internally by two organs namely the 
Honorary Assembly of the Constitutional Court and the Board of Ethics of 
Constitutional Justice.
Reconstruction of Ethics Supervision System of the Constitutional Justice 
for the Purpose of Maintaining and Upholding the Honor, Dignity, and Behavior 
of Future Constitutional Justice, namely:
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(1) Some most important aspects which underlie the need to do a normative 
reconstruction of ethics supervision of constitutional justices are as follows. 
First, at the level of legal basis, internal oversight of constitutional justice 
is clearly and firmly regulated in Law Number 8 of 2011, so there needs to 
be normative reconstruction on the provisions related to the supervision of 
constitutional justices. 
Second, regulation of the Board of Ethics of Constitutional Justice is 
ineffective and inefficient and overlaps with the Honorary Assembly of the 
Constitutional Court, so it is necessary to restructure it by only establishing 
one permanent supervisory organ.
Third, the Constitutional Court does not have the authority to create a new 
norm which replaces the norms of the Law through the Regulation of the 
Constitutional Court but must be through the revision of the Law.  
(2) Furthermore, the researcher will propose the reconstruction in the formulation 
of norms in the Draft Amendment to Law Number 24 of 2003 as amended 
by Law No. 8 of 2011, as described above.
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